National Ideology and Its Transfer:
Late Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Relations

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The Bases of Balkan Nationalism

Arousing of the nation and promoting the national ideology would come up as the key role in redefining the Balkan identities. The new era of modernity actually offers brand new standards in order to define the Otherness as a requirement to construct the borders of groups. While in the imperial era, the communities were the ones building the world's vision through religious systems and subjectnes as universal criteria, new-fangled conditions of the market economy and citizenship offered the new national country as a sole alternative along with nationalism as a necessary ideology.

However, in order to homogenize the upcoming national entities, there is a necessity to create mutual criteria for ethnicity that would regardless of the territorial bases or the linguistic-cultural distinctions have to create a unique ethnic conscience or expulsion that would be merely based on the so-called mutual collective memory. Therefore, even during the 19th century the proto-national intelligence would accelerate to establish the ethnical boundaries pursuant to the myth of the origin and the durability of the discrepancies. All of this would become an eternal task of social engineering that would hugely become a task to the creators shaped into the framework of the Balkan historiographies.

The national project needed necessarily to begin from the religious settlement in the late Ottoman Empire, and to generate nowadays a Balkan national discourse, which during the clash of the models for building a national ideology were heading from Western Europe. Since the original national ideology under the veil of liberalism, humanism and the Enlightenment would establish itself

within the Christian communities, therefore the ethnicity in regard to the Orthodox Church would become a basic criterion for building the national originality. In the early 19th century Pan-Orthodoxy would start its evolution towards the promotion of Pan-Slavism. The opposition to the executing of the service of "the Holly Greek Language" becomes the basic motif for the beginning of the search of the medieval empire roots of the Slavic communities.

This phase continues along with the subsequent transformation, while in the middle of the 19th century the Slavic groups begin to construct their own "ethnical boundaries" based on the speech dialect. In addition to that, while the Serbian nation creates an institutional frame at first, the Bulgarian proto-nationalism maintains the Pan-Slavic aspect for separation from the Orthodox Greek linguistic ecumenism. Hence, the Macedonian example would be equally headed towards the language distinction regarding the Greek at the end of the 19th century while constructing the boundaries of the Otherness, but seemingly in terms of the political distinction in regard to the Bulgarian and Serbian factor.

Proto-national elites generated by citizenships would firstly strive to construct separate churches that would further on establish the basic paradigms of the presence of the nation, while representing the secular modern system within the mass education. Hence, at least one generation would be needed to go through the educational institutions in order to conduct the project for creating a homogeneous nation. The myth of the national unity in the forthcoming phase could be harmonized in terms of the primary societal institutions of socialization, as it is the example of the Family. Nevertheless, in practice the inconstancy of the character of these institutions such as the variable nature, equally regarding the physical and ethnical boundaries, will prolong the complete national homogenization up until the first decades on the 20th century.

The nation's genesis becomes a fundamental element in its strengthening. Even if there is a fictive past, still it must be real. This is the reason why the culture continuity is contingent and inessential (Gellner, 1999: 34). Hence, the historical continuity needs to be invented, by creating an ancient past that would overcome the effective historical continuity either through semi-fiction or falsification (Smith, 2000: 53).[1] National thinkers attempt to provide answers to

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[1] According to Rousseau: "the first role that we need to follow is the one for the national character. Every population has or should have one, character; if it is lacking we need to start stimulating it. The politics for Renan is not enough. The coun-

the following questions: what is the nation's origin; what are the nation's dia-
critical features; who belongs and who does not; and what is the future of the
nation (Brunnbauer, 2004: 165).

"Critical markers" such as religion, language and mutual territory do not
denote one and same identity. Therefore there must be a so-called "invention of
the tradition", there must be a creation of "imaginative communities" and there
must be "a basic invented myth". The group needs to own a mutual famous past,
divine ancestors, and hard times in the past, etc. Smith does not argue on the sig-
nificance of the relativistic position of the historical truth and even not about it
being irrelevant for the national phenomenon. Clearly, the ability of the national
historians to document fables and exploding unsatisfactory fictions is an im-
portant element within the sustainable relations amongst past, present and fu-
ture, on which the national community is based (Smith, 2000: 55). As for Gell-
ner, the high cultures strive to become the basis of the new nationality when
right before the emergence of the nationalism, the religion was tightly defining
each underprivileged as an opposite of the privileged ones, especially and even
in times when the underprivileged haven't got other mutual positive feature
(such as the mutual history) (Gellner, 2008: 107).[2]

Geertz locates the most obvious changes that appear along the process
of national constituting within the second and the third phase, but the largest
part of the far-reaching changes – the ones that change the general direction of
the societal evolution-are happening less spectacularly in the first and the fourth
phase (Geertz, 2007: 329).[3]

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try as such cannot function solely as a socially cemented one nor can the rela-
tion among their citizens. It could be provided solely through the "history" or
even more through the historical comprehension and "the cult of the ances-
tors" (Smith, 2000: 8, 11).

[2] Each high culture needs a country, its own one, if possible. Not every wild culture can
become a high culture and those without a serious perspective in order to be-
come a high culture have a tendency to obey without a fight; they do not give
birth to nationalism (Gellner, 2008: 75).

[3] Geertz differentiates four phases within the development of nationalism:
First phase - the one in which the nations are being formed and crystallized
Second phase - when nations triumph
Third phase - when they are organized into states
Fourth phase - when after being organized into states become obliged to con-
firm and stabilize their relations as all the other states regarding the unregulated

I – Nationalism firstly appears as an expression of resistance to the foreign (foreign culture, language, religion, etc.). This resistance within the industrial society along with the sense for collective destiny with others creates the collective awareness and contributes to the generating of groups of intellectuals – the ones that consecutively are the first bearers of nationalism. They strive towards creating a political unit and further on towards creating a nation created by the country.

II – The euphoria lasts for a certain period after creating the state, but after the establishing of the institutional system the question arises again: "Why are we doing it?"

III – Creating the artificial " we" while the language is defined as an issue during the defining of the nation itself (Ibidem, 330-333)

Within the context of the Balkan nationalism and the building of the collective national awareness, the key role goes to the educational institutions, which through their own curricula reconstruct the vision of the common past. In addition to that, the primordial aspect for the organic origin of the nation predominates almost universally, which is primarily based on ethno-linguistic traits of the group. Speaking of the Macedonian historiography, as for Brunbauer, the national discourse is determined by the primordial and essential approach that refers to the national and ethnical identity as something inherited and not a subject of change (Brunbauer, 2004: 188).[4]

Late Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires and Ideology Transfer

The imperial age defines the relations between communities in pre-national era. The Balkan was roughly divided by the two Empires – the Austro-Hungarian (before the 1867 Habsburg Empire) and the Ottoman Empires. There are three dimensions toward re-conceptualization of the role of nationalism in the Empires:

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societies where they originate from (Geertz, 2007: 329-333).

[4] "Facts" are organized and the sources interpreted in a manner that would serve as an evidence of the existing of the Macedonian nation. The question about nation and nationalism in the Macedonian Historiography lacks theoretical basis (Brunnbauer, 2004: 189).

1. The capacity of an Empire to maintain the law and order within its borders, to protect those borders from external incursions, and to compete with other actors in the international system;

2. The second dimension concerns the degree to which an empire had or came to create institutions open to participation; and

3. The final dimension along which the empires differed from each other is the degree to which they were capable of fostering and controlling the modernization process (Commiso, 2006: 141, 142).

In the perception of the Balkan past, there are differences of those three dimensions in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian context. This creates visions of pre-national past "legitimateness", mainly constructed by modern national discourses. It is interesting that this negative perception to the imperial past is much lower in relation of the Austro-Hungarian heritage. Today in the Slovenian and Croatian contexts there is even a certain degree of nostalgia. This can be motivated by economic superiority, or self-governing autonomy of Croatia in the Empire, but the main reason is probably the same confessional origin of the subjects, non-regarding the ethnic, linguistic or cultural affiliations. In the latter sense, the Serbian perception is different and it is mainly a product of a different Orthodox Christianity. On the other hand the case of perception of the Ottoman past is opposite.

One of the most essential segments when reading the modern histories derives from the relation of the nation-states with their Ottoman past and their general interpretation of history. There are two approaches towards the Ottoman heritage of the Balkans: firstly, it is illegitimate (the myth about the Turkish slavery) and represents a black hole in the history of this region and secondly, the Ottoman heritage is experienced as a legitimate continuation of the Byzantine tradition (Mazower, 2000: 19, 20).

The first interpretation is the fundament on which every official historical fact of the Balkan nation-states was built, in which the Ottoman period is only the dark side of their history and this period appears only as an obstacle for the continuity of their medieval and ancient kingdoms and modern nation-states. The Orthodox Christian tradition of culture and religion of the Balkan peoples is incorporated in the function of their perception of the Ottoman past framed by religion providing a survival of those cultures. The latter is the base for building the national myths as well as the one that is named as "famous history of the ancestors" (Karakasidou, 1997:16). Speaking of which at the same time the fact that there is a perception of the West is used as follows *"The Balkans*

and the Adriatic as a final line of control and defence from the Muslim East" (Noris, 1999: 18).[5]

The second interpretation is to comprehend the Ottoman heritage as a complex symbiosis of the Turkish, the Islam and the Byzantine - actually the Balkan tradition. It is based on the logical assumption that the mutual life since few centuries ago needed to result with a mutual heritage (Todorova, 1997: 241). The Balkan is primarily very important as a western hypostasis of the Ottoman historical heritage, and its significance increases or decreases into one complex and indirect linkage with the refusing or accepting of the Ottoman past. This is the case of nowadays, especially when almost in all of the Turkish ideological and political spectra a profound re-examination of the Ataturk republican heritage is done (Ibidem, 74). Mazower claims that within the desire to become Europeans, the citizens of the Balkan national states ought to deny the legitimacy of the Ottoman past (Mazower, 2000:21). Thus, for example the discrepancies that were imposed to the Christian citizens in Macedonia in the national competition at the beginning of the 20th century radically violated the dynamics of trade, intercourse and coexistence that were present during the late Ottoman Era (Karakasidou, 1997: 84).

National - as opposed to religious, clan, or village-solidarities were considerably less prominent as a basis for collective action in the Balkans. Balkan revolts were typically defensive reactions to misgovernment, and when the outcomes were autonomy or sovereignty, it was usually because external powers found it convenient to force such concessions on Istanbul. The group activity in correlation with imperial politics can identify five possibilities:[6]

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[5] This viewpoint is followed with the perception that, with the exception of Albania, is built by the nation-states in terms of the process of Islamizing as illegitimate, regardless whether this process was done in a violent or peaceful way. Especially in the 20th century all of the above was used by the Bulgarian state to conduct a coercive re-Christianization of its citizens, while the rest of the nationalisms, the attitude towards the Muslim monolinguals remained as discursive attitude towards the Otherness, equally produced from the Christians non-accepting of the group but also from the refusing of the Muslim communities to be integrated into the frame of the national whole.

[6] There are three major techniques of maintaining domination:
    1. Imperial states maintain authority over their population through the legitimisation of a supranational ideology that includes a religious claim to be the protectors of Christendom or Islam, and an elaborate ideology of descent

1. Insurrectionaries / nationalists: Real "nationalists" like "Croatia's Right" Starcevic, but also "Yugoslav" Supilo and Trumbic, or for example Theodor Herzl for the Jewish population;

2. Pragmatists / accommodationalists: Accommodation is related to various areas like local autonomy, language use, participation in civil service, subsidies for local cultural institutions, etc. The Austro-Hungarian empire is a typical example of this approach;

3. Collaboration / assimilation: Many individuals or elites as well as those with non-elite status were entirely willing to be absorbed into the ruling class of the empire even if it meant abandoning their "national" allegiance for this purpose. This strategy was often motivated by an opportunity for upward mobility. For example in the early 19th century many of non-Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire became "Greek" motivated by or as a result of social mobility and urban status.

4. Parochialism: For the large agrarian population, the parochialism presumably was the dominant attitude of the mass population, which was simply not politicized and thought in terms of lord and village rather than nation and state. The modernisation is the key factor of "national awakening";

5. Anationals: The final possibility is a set of choices, whereby an individual's political activity was defined by interests and solidarities that were not national at all. That is, in many cases occupation, class, or confession wepe a far more important determinant of an individual's political behaviour than nationality. In this sense we should mentioned the influence of the socialist parties and

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and lineage;

2. Imperial states maintain rule over a multireligious and multiethnic diversity through a variety of policies from "toleration" of diversity and its incorporation to forced conversion and assimilation. Religious, utilitarian, and strategic reasons drive imperial state elites to incorporate order diversity. Empires are different along this continuum, but within the same empire different moments in history have given rise to different policies as well.

3. Imperial states maintain control over a diversity of elites for political and economic reasons. Politically states maintain control through divide and conquer strategies, keeping elites separate, distinct and dependent on the central state. Such control also entails vertical integration into the state, but accompanied by fragmentation at the horizontal level of social arrangements. Economically the structure of elite arrangements also determines how a state will provide for its financial and military needs (Barkey, 2006: 174, 175).

ideologies in the period of *finne du sciecle* (Commiso, 143-153).

After series of defeats (in wars against Piedmont, Sardinia, France in 1859, and Prussia in 1866) the Habsburg Empire redefined its internal relations. In 1867, the Habsburg ruler's title was modified to reflect the distinction between his status as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. The political and administrative division of the state was reinforced by establishment of separate Austrian and Hungarian parliaments in what had become a constitutional Dual Monarchy (Roshwald, 2001: 10, 11). In the Habsburg empire (and later and in Austria-Hungary), state action led to initial industrialization and the development of microenterprises in the western lands, but strong politization and elite opposition in Hungary. The key state-society link via the nobility started to shift toward resistance. In the Ottoman Empire, state action led to the rise of powerful new local notable class, whose relationship to the state was defined by tax farming, and alternative mode of state financing. It is in those new modalities that elites engaged the state, built new institutional frames, and restructured social and political relations in opposition to the state, or strategized to protect themselves and their resources (Barkey, 181).

Barkey argues that between 1867-1914, the glue that held the Austro-Hungarian Empire together - the central legitimating ideology, the management of diversity, and control of resources through state-elite relations - no longer favoured the Empire. The central legitimating ideology - a dynastic ideal, did not adapt to the political structure in the realm. At no time after 1848 did the monarchy attempt to develop a greater national understanding of itself and the institutions that emerged after the Compromise of 1867 did not promote unity between constituent parts. They rather promoted division. Additionally when the ideals of national self- determination had become part of the world system of ideals, managing diversity was much harder. While the Austrian part of the Empire was more flexible toward different cultural and linguistic groups, the Hungarian elites were quite willing to take the historic mission of creating a Hungarian nation. These elite had envisaged building a nation in the French model, though they had a much harder task at hand, in that the differences between themselves and the Slavic groups were vast (Ibidem, 184-188).

After the Unification of Germany, Austria-Hungary focused its interests on the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans. In its movement towards the southeast, the monarchy had certain positive assets. The first one was the dominance as a military power. Secondly, Austro-Hungary could hold out to the Slavic peoples of the free states and the Ottoman territories the attractions of

western civilization, although Vienna vas faced with the competition from Paris. Thirdly, the monarchy could offer great economic advantages. Yet the main internal opposition was coming from the Hungarian entity which strongly opposed any pro-Slav politics, and the external factor seen in the expansion of Tsarist Russian influence, based on the Slavdom and Orthodoxy (Jelavich, 1958: 2, 3). In 1870s the Austro-Hungarian Minister Andrassy spent good deal of secret service money in combating Russian, and promoting Austro-Hungarian influence in Bosnia by building Catholic churches and schools and encouraging the propaganda activities of the Croatian bishop Strosmayer (Bridge, 1972: 68-70). The finalization came with the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1878, and its annexation in 1908. At the same time after 1885, Austro-Hungary intensified its relations with Bulgaria, and the key year in its relations with Serbia was 1903. The Macedonian question also attracted the attention of the Great Powers, and in the eve of the Balkan Wars, the idea of an Albanian state.

The variegated and fluid structure of Ottoman rule was neither founded upon a generally accepted understanding of Ottoman identity, nor was this system conducive to the cultivation of a uniform sense of belonging among the subjects of the Empire. The population was broadly classified on the bases of religion as Muslim, Christian and Jewish. The approach towards the population was more opportunistic and pragmatic than systematic. The Ottoman state was neither seeking to meld together the separate communities nor consciously planting the seeds of further divisions. In addition of their religion, the subjects of the Ottoman Empire would also identify themselves on the bases of their household, tribe, or clan. Those multiple frames of reference and identification cut across, overlapped, or sometimes coincided with each other (Kasaba, 2006: 204-207).[7]

Quite different from the Habsburg pattern, the Ottoman Empire from the first half of the 19th century becomes unable to keep its fiscal house in order. The Ottomans had early on recognized the British and the French by giving

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[7] In the Ottoman Empire among an overwhelmingly rural population, loyalties tended to be centred on family, village, and locality, and identities were more religious then secular and national. Cultural revivals were spearheaded by individuals living outside the empire (e.g. the first dictionary of modern Greek was published in Vienna, the Serbian cultural revival took place in Hungary, etc.) and were a product of those exposed to the "modern" economy taking shape in the more developed European areas (Commiso, 2006: 156).

them capitulations. Also Russia was managing to keep the pressure by military interventions. As a result the transformation of the Empire initiated by the Tanzimat reforms was only partial[8]. The concept of Ottomanism, exposed by intellectuals and state leaders in the Young Ottoman movement was an attempt to create an alternative vision, partly based on the ideas of constitutionalism that would unite the disparate segments of elites, though it did not attract the non-Muslim groups who were increasingly drawn to the West (Barkey, 2006: 189-191).

The attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Empire versus the Ottoman Empire was not as simple as diplomatic relations level of cooperation and conflict. The core of modernization and systems transformation in the second half of the 19th century was motivated and inspired by new ideological expectations of the masses, predominantly in the sense of a desire to create a national state and redefinition of collective identities toward the nation. The ideology was a product of the West, so Austria-Hungary was the space of production and exportation of models of nationalism in the Balkans. This refers to the models for national constituting and building of the nation alone. Namely, within the context of the Balkans up until now for the current scientific thought dominates the assumption that the nations are based on an ethno-linguistic model of existence of the organic settled nations. The basic substantial national element is language and culture and the territory according to those aspects bears the second denotation. However, as long as some deepened substantial theoretical analyses are done, the conclusion is different. Starting from the assumption of Brubaker according to which the French comprehension of nationalism is state-centred and assimilation-oriented and the German one is Volk-centred and differentiating-oriented; therefore, the first one is based on building universal cultural values and the second one is based on organic cultural, linguistic or racial communities. Hence, the second comprehension of nation is ethnocentrically considered and not as a political fact (Brubaker, 1999: 1).[9] Such interpretation of Brubaker

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[8] During the Tanzimat reform period crucial transformation of Ottoman understanding of diversity occurred, where Ottomans were forced into a new world order of citizenship and equality. None of the 19th century forms of accommodation would be successful at reconstructing a tolerant society (Barkey, 2006: 177).

[9] Most nations live by mixed territorial models. One territorial political unit could become homogenous only in cases after smothering, expelling or assimilating every non-member of the nation. Their unwillingness to accept the destiny as

could be implemented in the framework of the Balkan historical-national context, while there would be two phases differentiated within the national construction:

1. The first phase includes the French model, using the assimilative power positioned on a political basis;

2. While in the second phase, the sense of ethnicity of the organ nations or the ethnos is built, which after the ascertaining will get a tendency to recycle with the next generations.[10]

The two stages are related to the influence of Paris and Vienna in transfer of patterns of collective redefinition. In the first half of the 19th century, the French territorial model was widely accepted.[11] Therefore, the new Balkan states as Serbia and Greece understood nationalism in the sense of territorial distribution and needed to create their nations on the base of firstly established statehood. The development of ideas of ethno nationalism started around 1848, and the promotion of "the Great Idea" in Greece and "Nachrtanie"[12] in Serbia. In this period, even Ottomans had strictly territorial attribution, and the Bulgarian identity was nothing more than a form of Panslavism. The decline of law was the reason for disturbances in the Ottoman Empire. In Serbia there were literally acts of self-defence against the violent elements of the Empire. The Janissaries massacred local and loyal village chefs. In Greece it was the peasant revolt

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such could burden the quiet implementation of the national principle (Gellner, 2008: 7).

[10] The national unity is being less maintained on the basis of referring to blood connections and ethnicity in the country and more on the obligation and loyalty towards the civil state, while more or less it is replenished with the usage of the mechanisms for coercion and ideological stimuli (Geertz, 2007: 11).

[11] By Mishkova "the intellectual connection to France and Germany often entailed rival political models and institutional arrangements - e.g. republicanism vs. monarchism, social revolution vs. organic evolution, liberalism vs. socialism "(Mishkova, 2009: 24). But also territorial, civic model of nationalism vs. ethno-nationalism. We must note that Austro-Hungary is at the same time at the border line of unification nationalism of Germany and Italy and the separatist nationalism, present in Hungary and predominant in the Balkans (Smith, 2001: 39-41).

[12] The "Nachrtanie" was created by Ilija Garashanin, but under the influence of Chartoriski, and his representative in Serbia, Frantisek A. Zach (Petrovich, 1976: 231).

in Peloponnesus, and in Bulgaria it was not even much of a peasant revolt. The distinction of those revolts in comparison to Ali Pasha of Janina, according to Commiso is not a "national" impulse, but rather the Great Power intervention (Commiso, 2006: 157).

The stage of promotion of ethno nationalism was product of ideas by German thinkers and universities. These ideas could be practically utilized in the East only after the unification of Germany and Italy. The main mediator was the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its intellectuals and institutions.[13] The transfer of ideology came mainly from two directions: from the Western representatives in the Ottoman Empire, and by education of the first local protonational elites.

Many of the fathers of the future nations that emerged from post Ottoman realm were under direct or indirect influence of the new ideas of the West. The Greek thinker Adamantios Korais was born and lived most of his life in Paris; Rigas Velestinlis also spent some time in Paris, as well as many of the future Young Ottomans (Kasaba, 2006: 212). On other hand in the mid 19th century an attempt to build cultural bridges between South Slavs was made by Joseph Strossmayer, who founded the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb. As opposite to this view, Ante Starcevic, the founder of the Croatian Party of Rights, articulated Croatian nationalism. Finally, the Serb nationalism emerged in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina with it culmination with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 (Roshwald, 2001: 13, 14). In the same context the founder of Croatia's Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic was under direct influence from Tomas Masaryk and his ideas about the Czech and Slovak progressive movement, but now in Croatian interpretation and its national revival. In the same context there was certain influence by Masaryk and among Croatia's Serbs in favour of pro-

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[13] The traditional pattern of the scenario in the Balkans is roughly the following:
   1. "Cultural revival" among elements living abroad;
   2. Local disturbances growing out of general decline of law and order;
   3. Reprisals by the Ottoman army in an attempt to restore order;
   4. Diplomatic or military intervention by the Great Powers, either following an actual or preceding a threat of Russian intervention;
   5. Creation of a self-governing unit that either is or becomes a recognized "state"; and
   6. The restoration of law and order by the unit, typically involving putting down the revolt, which is then described as "national" (Commiso, 2006: 157).

motion of their cultural identity (Ibidem, 46, 47).[14] In 1830, Ljudevit Gaj met Jan Kollar, a Slavic poet who was already beginning to think of the means to promote literary cooperation among the various Slav peoples. Kollar was influenced by Herder accepting his concept of a poet as the "creator of nationality". He believed there was a Slav nationality, which existed in the language, literature and customs of the Slavs as elaborated in his: "Ideen zur Philosophie des Geschichte der Menschheit" (Wolton, 2004: 6,7). In Montenegro, the tutor of Njegos, Sima Milovanovic-Sarajlija, was under direct influence from Herder, Jacob Grim and Goethe. In addition, there was influence between Kopitar and Karadzic, Gaj and Presern etc. (Ibidem, 7).

Aleksov noted that "the celebration of the autochthonous features of a nation and the originality of its folk poetry was established in Western Europe in the 18th century by Rousseau, Macpherson, Percy and Herder in particular, and spread through Vienna and German universities. Moreover, the early Slavists were influenced by the theory identifying people based on the language, which was formulated by the German philologist Schlozer (Aleksov, 2009: 279). Some of the most influential people among the Southern Slavs were the Czech Slavists, Shafarik[15] and Hanka. Furthermore, in Vienna in 1848 the first Department of Slavistics was founded by Fr. Mikloshic, and in 1850s there was an agreement for a mutual Serbo-Croatian language (Ristovski, 1999: 25).

The Macedonian Question – Reframed

In the 19th century Macedonia represents a geographic unity that includes most of the lands of the three administrative units - the vilayets of Kosovo (Skopje), Monastir (Bitola) and Salonica (Adanir, 1998: 241; Brown,

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[14] Desplatovic describes the phenomenon, summarizing in general terms the transformation of ideology in South-Eastern Europe: "Croatia's neighbours, the Slovenes, the Hungarians, the Germans, the Italians and the Serbs of Vojvodina, had already begun their period of natural renaissance. Croatian students attending the universities of Vienna, Pest, Graz, came in contact with those movements..." (Wilton, 2004: 10).

[15] Shafarik attempts to develop autonomous philological disciplines of the small Slav peoples. "The presentation of the autonomous, united and contingent development of Slav languages and literature is presented by Pavel Shafarik in his "Geschichte der slavischen Sprashe und Literatur nach allen Mundorten", published in 1825" (Kiossev, 2002: 177).

2003: 37). The real issue of the Macedonian question originates from the clash of the Ottoman traditionalism represented through its administrative organization and the imported idea of nationalism. The last one produces the idea of the nature and character of the Macedonia's population, and its boundaries, no matter if they are geographically functional, ethnic or historical product. The definition of the Christian population of Macedonia is a subject of nationalistic contestation by the young Balkan nation-states, and the very idea of definition generates the Macedonian question (or questions).

In Ottoman Macedonia there is a lack of a unified idea for ethnicity definition, often presented as *Sallade Macedoine*. The Slavs from Macedonia did not have clearly developed feeling of national identity and there models of self-identification were shaped from the neighbouring churches (The Patriarchy of Constantinople and the Bulgarian Exarchate). In other cases the ethnic categories were hidden behind the social status, like for example the general notion that the "Greeks" are the urban population, the "Bulgarians" are the peasants, and the "Vlachs" are nomadic shepherds" (Marinov, 2009: 108).

The theses of racial nationalism present in most of the memoirs of the European travellers often did not correspond to the Ottoman social context, not presenting the real self- identification character of the population. Most of the Christians with Slav origin, peasants from the villages near Salonika probably did not define themselves either as Greeks or as Bulgarians. Even some of them who did have strong feelings of loyalty toward Greece or Bulgaria, when asked who they were, often insisted that they always had been "Christians" (Mazover, 2004: 219).

This religious identification at the beginning of the 19th century was characteristic for all future Balkan nations. The national myths of the Serbs, Bulgarians or Greeks were constructed along with the nation building processes projected by the state institutions. For example, in 1830 Jacob Fallmeraier attacked the national stance that the modern Hellenic people were the descendants of the Classical Period and claimed that they were mainly Slavs and Albanians. As a response to that Paparigopoulu claimed that the Hellenic identity was linguistic and cultural, but not racial. He strengthened the position of Byzantinism as a positive part of that certain continuity, which civil code was adopted by Kapodistria in 1928 and King Otto in 1835 (Karas, 2004: 318). This aspect of the Greek historiography fundamentalists justified the assimilation that was transforming from the significance of the "Holly" language in church service to a more contemporary interpretation of the power of "the high culture" that

in the case of the Greek nation was represented through language and culture.[16]

Macedonian late identity can be simply explained by lack of institutions, or presence of other national institutional agencies. The different identity of part of the Slav population in Macedonia starts its development in the mid 19th century, through:

– Increased manifestation of local feelings;

– The popularity of the Uniate Churches;

– The publications of schoolbooks on local dialects; and

– Later, the separatism is generated after the establishment of the Exarchate, the codification of the eastern dialects as an official Bulgarian language, and the formation of Bulgarian state in 1878 (Brooks, 2005: 130, 131).

In December 1884, William Gladstone presented the slogan "Macedonia to the Macedonians". In addition, Edith Durham noted: "I met people who believed that they were a separate race, which they called "Macedonian"…" (Ibidem, 160-169). In 1871 the Bulgarian Petko Raco Slaveikov wrote that one decade back the Macedonians declared themselves as a separate nation (Minovski, 2008: 78). In 1890 K. Hron in "Das Volksthum der slaven Makedoniens, Ein Beitrag zur klärung der Orientfrage" published in Vienna noted: "…in any case it may be proven, in their history and in their language that the Macedonians are not Serbs, nor Bulgarians, but a separate people…" (Ristevski, 1999: 45, 46). Moreover, at the beginning of the 20th century, Beresford noted "the Slavs in European Turkey yet don't have highly developed national conscience, and the one they own is recent. They do not have passion for their nationality, but for their land. They are peoples rooted to the land, in their ancient villages, with imitated feelings religiously orientated to their mountains, rivers and ancient churches. The nation of those conservative peasants in short time will be developed in a real local patriotism". And this happened - "their ballads for rebellion, in which they talk about "Macedonia" are in every lyric proving that they already have their own fatherland" (Brailsford, 1906: 184).

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[16] Thus, Paschalis Kitromilides refers to the cultural continuity through which "the forms of cultural expression, related to the Christian kingdoms and Orthodox service are inherited". The other argument that is used is the opposition of the Palaeologists forwarded equally towards both the western Catholicism and the Ottoman-Turks, which is interpreted as an issue for expressing the Greek nationalism. But the question arises: Is this Byzantine (Romaic) sentiment only a confessional loyalty or is it ethno-religious nationalism? (Smith. 2000: 43).

The last notion shows the importance of the idea of fatherland in the Macedonian proto-national inteligencia. This was the moving force of IMRO's autonomy program of in the late 19th century. The necessity for statehood was more important than the promotion of the ethno-linguistic character of the Macedonians. The inteligencia was aware that there is a need of territorial model as the first stage, and the ethnical model could be developed afterwards. The transfer of national ideology at the beginning of the 20th century did not come from Paris or Vienna. The Macedonian revolutionaries were simply following the patterns of national constitution of their neighbours - primarily the Serbs and the Bulgarians and their histories.

The Macedonian proto-nationalism, even its late state constitution, develops itself together with the other Balkan nations. The first stage includes the Enlightenment related to the church institutions and without explicit national character. In the mid 19th century, the Otherness is built through political mobilization related to the Church Educational Communities in Macedonia and the initiatives for resurrection of the Ohrid Archbishopric. Until the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in IMRO's image a proto-institutional and proto-national framework is created. At this time, the national Macedonian identity is yet a privilege of the intellectuals and national romanticists. However, the Macedonian proto-nation develops with a potential of growing into a fully defined nation. This process develops in parallel with the strong external influences by the neighbouring states, their pretension to the Macedonian territory, the monopoly in the creations of historical visions, and national affiliation of their population. In this sense, we have to mention that because of the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire and the Christian character of the Balkan nation-states, the Muslims initially were excluded from national pretensions.

The second national stage in the building of Macedonian nation incorporates the period of the second half of the 20th century. There are three sub-stages: the first one starting from the foundation of the state and "ASNOM" until the 1970s. The second substage is from the 1970s until the 1990s, when the national sovereignty is formally transferred from the previous centralized Yugoslavia to the federal republics, and in sense that in the national model in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia the ethnic character of the nation is openly promoted. And the third substage includes the independence and the post 2001 conflict period, when Macedonia's Constitution is shifted toward clear civil model, but in practice the reality shows bi-national (Macedonian-Albanian) statehood.

Finally, I would like to go back to the beginning, comparing the processes of creation of national identities in the Balkans with the actual "name issue" dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia. The basic models of nation-building include both civil and ethnic aspects. The main reason for Greece is to limit any national building myth on today's territory of Republic Macedonia, and in this way to gain monopoly not only on the Ancient Macedonian heritage of Alexander the Great, but also on the Slav Macedonian originated values such as Cyril and Methodius origin from Salonika. The problem of Republic of Macedonia is that the most prominent fathers of the nation such as Goce Delcev or Krste Misirkov come from today's "Greek Macedonia". At the same time the Greek nation building process creates the vision of the so-called "Slavophone" population (people who speak a Slavic language, but are Greeks by nationality), which essentially is rather racist one, based on the power of assimilation of the 19th century "Greek High Culture", which in recent history has created situations of practicing methods of genocide against Macedonian minority, including the last case in the Greek Civil War when more than 25 thousand Macedonian children had to leave their homes. Ultimately, the Greek argument of monopolization of the name by Macedonian side is not a product of desire by the Macedonian state or institutions, but the international status of the Republic of Macedonia.

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